Collective and individual rationality: Maynard Keynes' methodological standpoint and policy prescription by Denis, A.
              
City, University of London Institutional Repository
Citation: Denis, A. (2002). Collective and individual rationality: Maynard Keynes' 
methodological standpoint and policy prescription. Research in Political Economy, 20, pp. 
187-215. 
This is the accepted version of the paper. 
This version of the publication may differ from the final published 
version. 
Permanent repository link:  http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/18416/
Link to published version: 
Copyright and reuse: City Research Online aims to make research 
outputs of City, University of London available to a wider audience. 
Copyright and Moral Rights remain with the author(s) and/or copyright 
holders. URLs from City Research Online may be freely distributed and 
linked to.
City Research Online:            http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/            publications@city.ac.uk
City Research Online
  
 
 
 
“Collective and individual rationality: Maynard Keynes’s 
methodological standpoint and policy prescription” 
 
Andy Denis* 
 
 
Department of Economics, School of Social Sciences,  
City University, London 
  
 
Research in Political Economy, 2002, Vol 20, December, 187-
215 
 
  
  
  
  
Contact details: 
Andy Denis, PhD 
Lecturer in Economics 
Department of Economics 
City University 
Northampton Square 
London EC1V 0HB 
  
Telephone: +44 (0) 20 7040 0257  
Fax: +44 (0) 20 7040 8580 
Email: a.m.p.denis@city.ac.uk 
URL: http://www.staff.city.ac.uk/andy.denis/ 
  
  
2 
Abstract 
 
In a world of partially overlapping and partially conflicting interests there is good 
reason to doubt that self-seeking behaviour at the micro-level will spontaneously lead 
to desirable social outcomes at the macro-level.  Nevertheless, some sophisticated 
economic writers advocating a laissez-faire policy prescription have proposed various 
‘invisible hand’ mechanisms which can supposedly be relied upon to ‘educe good from 
ill’.  Smith defended the ‘simple system of natural liberty’ as giving the greatest scope 
to the unfolding of God’s will and the working out of ‘natural’, providential processes 
free of interference by ‘artificial’ state intervention – the expression not of divine order 
but of fallible human reason.  Hayek, adopting a similar policy stance, based it in an 
evolutionary process in which those institutional forms best adapted to reconciling 
individual interests would, he believed, spontaneously be selected for in the inter-group 
struggle for survival. 
 
Keynes shares the holistic approach of Smith and Hayek, but without their reliance on 
invisible hand mechanisms.  If spontaneous processes cannot be relied upon to generate 
desirable social outcomes then we have to take responsibility for achieving this 
ourselves by establishing the appropriate institutional framework.   
 
Keynes takes a historical view of the role of capitalism and analyses its pathology as 
rooted in what we would now refer to as a multi-player prisoners’ dilemma.  The paper 
draws out the significance of his methodological standpoint here.  Keynes’s policy 
standpoint assigns a critical role to his own class, the ‘educated bourgeoisie’ in the 
reform process he maps out.  A distinction, but also an intimate connection, is 
highlighted between, on the one hand, micro-level individualism (the ‘Manchester 
System’), and, on the other, the macro-level collective action (‘planning’) required to 
preserve it.  Finally Keynes is considered in relation to the themes of laissez-faire, 
holism, reductionism, providentialism and the invisible hand.   
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I Introduction 
  
In previous papers (Denis, 1996a, b, 1997, 1999a, b, 2000, 2002a, b), and in my PhD 
thesis (Denis, 2001), I have tried to show two things: Firstly, that in a world of partially 
overlapping and partially conflicting interests there is good reason to doubt that self-
seeking behaviour at the micro-level will spontaneously lead to desirable social 
outcomes at the macro-level.  And, secondly, that some sophisticated economic writers 
who would like us to rely on the spontaneous interaction of self-seeking agents, writers 
advocating a laissez-faire policy prescription, have proposed various ‘invisible hand’ 
mechanisms which can, in their view, be relied upon to ‘educe good from ill’.  Smith, I 
argued, defended the ‘simple system of natural liberty’ as giving the greatest scope to 
the unfolding of God’s will and the working out of ‘natural’, providential processes free 
of interference by ‘artificial’ state intervention – the expression not of divine order but 
of fallible human reason.  Hayek, adopting a similar policy stance, based it in an 
evolutionary process in which those institutional forms best adapted to reconciling 
individual interests would, he believed, spontaneously be selected for in the inter-group 
struggle for survival. 
  
The purpose of the present paper is to cast a light on this issue from another direction 
by displaying an example of the policy consequences of adopting an alternative 
methodological stance.  The argument of the paper is that (a) staying within the holistic 
methodological framework of Smith and Hayek, but (b) rejecting their invisible hand 
mechanisms, leads (c) to the rejection of their reductionist laissez-faire policy stance as 
well.   
  
The structure of the paper is as follows.  In Section 2 I show Keynes’s view of the 
historical role of capitalism and his analysis of its pathology, rooted in what we would 
now refer to as the prisoners’ dilemma.  Section 3 draws attention to the fundamental 
significance of his methodological standpoint.  This lays the basis for a consideration 
of his policy prescription in the following two sections.  Section 4 looks at two very 
important aspects to the question, spelling out Keynes’s call for planning, and 
explaining exactly what he meant by this.  Before doing so however – and this is the 
other key aspect to the question – the section examines Keynes’s class standpoint, 
showing the critical role he expected his own class, the ‘educated bourgeoisie’, to play 
in the reform process he mapped out.  Section 5 adds a further layer to the consideration 
of Keynes’s policy prescription, drawing out the distinction, but also the intimate 
connection, between, on the one hand, micro-level individualism (the ‘Manchester 
System’), and, on the other, the macro-level collective action (‘planning’) required to 
preserve it.  Finally, Section 6 concludes by considering Keynes in relation to the 
themes of the research of which this paper is part – Smith and Hayek, holism, 
reductionism and the invisible hand.  
  
II Keynes’s historical perspective 
  
Whereas, for Smith and Hayek capitalist individualism is the terminus of an ontogenetic 
process, for Keynes it is something transitional, something with a historical and 
conditional validity.  Keynes’s historical perspective is thus consistent with a 
phylogenetic evolutionary stance.  Laissez-faire in Keynes’s conception performed a 
vital historical role, carrying us from an Era of Scarcity to an Era of Abundance.  It was 
precisely because it had substantially fulfilled that role that it had become counter-
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productive.  The point is controversial.  Joan Robinson claimed that Keynes ‘saw the 
capitalist system as ... a phase in historical development’ (Robinson, 1964: 71); 
Geoffrey Pilling, on the other hand, criticising both Keynes and Robinson, writes that 
‘It is just this historical conception of capitalism which is absent in Keynes’ (Pilling, 
1986: 35, and n1).  The purpose of this section is to show that Robinson was right, and 
Pilling wrong1, on this point: to establish Keynes’s conception of the historical role of 
capitalism – though not, I should emphasise, necessarily to defend it.   
  
In order to establish Keynes’s view of the historical and historically limited role of 
laissez-faire, we must say something about his conception of the historical context, that 
is, about his periodisation of history.  I have attempted to reconstruct Keynes’s view 
here by rereading ‘Am I a Liberal?’ (Keynes, 1925b) in the light of his later works, in 
particular ‘Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren’ (Keynes, 1930c), and Book 
VI of the General Theory, ‘Short Notes Suggested by the General Theory’ (Keynes, 
1973a: 313-384). 
  
The first great era in Keynes’s scheme takes in prehistoric, ancient and medieval times.  
In the ‘Era of Scarcity’ (Keynes, 1972a: 304) production is overwhelmingly production 
for the sake of consumption, indeed subsistence purposes: ‘The economic problem, the 
struggle for subsistence, always has been hitherto the primary, most pressing problem 
of the human race – not only of the human race, but of the whole of the biological 
kingdom from the beginning of life in its most primitive forms’ (Keynes, 1972a: 326-
327).  During the Era of Scarcity, there is an overwhelming obstacle to the accumulation 
of capital in the form of uncertainty driving the marginal efficiency of capital (MEC) 
below the rate of interest (i): 
  
“The destruction of the inducement to invest by an excessive liquidity-preference was the 
outstanding evil, the prime impediment to the growth of wealth, in the ancient and 
medieval worlds.  And naturally so, since certain of the risks and hazards of economic life 
diminish the marginal efficiency of capital while others serve to increase the preference 
for liquidity.  In a world, therefore, which no one reckoned to be safe, it was almost 
inevitable that the rate of interest … would rise too high to permit of an adequate 
inducement to invest.” (Keynes, 1973a: 351) 
  
At – so to speak – the other end of history from the era of scarcity, in the near future, 
lies ‘our destination of economic bliss’ (Keynes, 1972a: 331), ‘economic paradise’ 
(Keynes, 1972a: 268), ‘the age of leisure and abundance’ (Keynes, 1972a: 328).  ‘The 
economic problem may be solved, or be at least within sight of solution, within a 
hundred years ... the economic problem ... is not the permanent problem of the human 
race’ (Keynes, 1972a: 326).  The essence of the era of abundance is that ‘needs are 
satisfied in the sense that we prefer to devote our further energies to non-economic 
purposes’ (Keynes, 1972a: 326).  Thus, we may note in passing, production here, too, 
is for the sake of consumption in the broadest sense: ‘for the first time since his creation 
man will be faced with his real, his permanent problem – how to use his freedom from 
pressing economic cares …. to live wisely and agreeably and well’ (Keynes, 1972a: 
328). 
  
The following year, in the Preface (dated 1931) to Essays in Persuasion (Keynes, 
1972a), a collection of essays spanning a dozen years, this approaching liberation from 
economic care has become his ‘central thesis throughout’: ‘the day is not far off when 
the economic problem will take the back seat where it belongs, and that the arena of the 
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heart and head will be occupied ... by our real problems – the problems of life and 
human relations, of creation and behaviour and religion’ (Keynes, 1972a: xviii).  This 
messianic strand, though expressed in more sober language, still plays a central, and, 
indeed, even more urgent, role in the General Theory.  The age of abundance now 
appears as the ‘quasi-stationary community’ (Keynes, 1973a: 220), and is to be attained, 
not in our grandchildren’s time, but ‘within a single generation’ (Keynes, 1973a: 220), 
‘say within twenty-five years or less’ (Keynes, 1973a: 324).   
  
The modern period, the third historical division or ‘economic order’ (Keynes, 1972a: 
304) in Keynes’s schema, is the age of capitalism.  This period does not have the 
fundamental, self-sufficient character of the other two epochs, but is simply the period 
of transition from the one to the other.  As such it is not an end in itself but a means to 
an end lying beyond itself, namely our entry into the ‘economic paradise’.  Hence our 
judgement of capitalism must refer, not to how pleasant or otherwise it may be, but to 
its efficacy in achieving that end: 
  
“Many people, who are really objecting to capitalism as a way of life, argue as though they 
were objecting to it on the ground of its inefficiency in attaining its own objects … For my 
part I think that capitalism, wisely managed, can probably be made more efficient for 
attaining economic ends than any alternative system yet in sight, but that in itself it is in 
many ways extremely objectionable.”  (Keynes, 1972a: 294)  
  
Capitalism achieves this end, in Keynes’s view, by means of the accumulation of 
capital, and, for Keynes, the rate of capital accumulation is the measure of the rate of 
our approach to the economic paradise.  To denote the motives to this accumulation of 
capital, Keynes spoke of ‘compound interest’ (Keynes, 1972a: 324) and ‘purposiveness’ 
(Keynes, 1972a: 329).  By this latter peculiar expression, ‘purposiveness’, he merely 
means money-making as an end in itself, saving, ostensibly for future consumption, but 
actually for the sake of accumulating claims on future production; saving not in order 
to enjoy the deferred consumption later, but in order to secure a stream of unearned 
income.  Keynes analyses ‘purposiveness’ psychologically as an attempt to gain 
immortality by projecting one’s actions into an indefinite future by means of an infinite 
regress: 
  
“purposiveness means that we are more concerned with the remote future results of our 
actions than with their own quality ... the purposive man is always trying to secure a 
spurious and delusive immortality for his acts by pushing his interest in them forward in 
time.” (Keynes, 1972a: 330) 
  
Just as Marx, in the Communist Manifesto, for example, was outspoken in his praise 
for the achievements of capitalism (Marx and Engels, 1976: 489), Keynes, too, paid 
tribute to those achievements: ‘In the nineteenth century this epoch culminated 
gloriously in the victories of laissez-faire and historic Liberalism.’ (Keynes, 1972a: 
304)  The accumulation of capital depended upon the freedoms of laissez-faire – in 
particular, private properly in the means of production and unrestricted scope for the 
operation of market forces: 
  
“The system worked, throughout Europe, with an extraordinary success and facilitated the 
growth of wealth on an unprecedented scale.  To save and invest became at once the duty 
and the delight of a class.  The savings were seldom drawn on, and, accumulating at 
compound interest, made possible the material triumphs which we now all take for granted.  
The morals, the politics, the literature, and the religion of the age joined in a grand 
conspiracy for the promotion of saving.” (Keynes, 1972a: 62) 
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In one of his essays on Liberalism, where he applied to his own views the term ‘New 
Liberalism’ (Keynes, 1972a: 305), he remarked that ‘old-fashioned individualism and 
laissez-faire ... contributed to the success of the nineteenth-century ... I should have 
belonged to this party [sc the Liberal Party] if I had been born a hundred years earlier’ 
(Keynes, 1972a: 300-301). 
  
While recognising the historical necessity and legitimacy of the laissez-faire system, 
and appreciating the benefits of its ‘material triumphs’, Keynes nevertheless deprecated 
the subversion of morals he believed it involved: ‘we have exalted some of the most 
distasteful of human qualities into the position of highest virtues.’ (Keynes, 1972a: 329)  
Keynes is here protesting against the fact that capitalism requires, and laissez-faire 
permits, the transformation of the economy from production for the sake of 
consumption to production for the sake of profit, for the sake of the accumulation of 
wealth.  Saving for the sake of future consumption Keynes can put up with; saving in 
order ‘to exploit the scarcity value of capital’ (Keynes, 1973a: 376) is morally 
reprehensible. 
  
That mankind has had to depend on this sort of egoistic materialism in order to raise 
itself from scarcity to abundance had had, according to Keynes, widespread deleterious 
consequences.  Defining capitalism as ‘egotistic atomism’, he complains that: ‘modern 
capitalism is absolutely irreligious, without internal union, without much public spirit, 
often ... a mere congeries of possessors and pursuers’ (Keynes, 1972a: 267).  ‘I think 
that Capitalism ... in itself is in many ways extremely objectionable’ (Keynes, 1972a: 
294).   
  
“[T]he moral problem of our age is concerned with the love of money, with the habitual 
appeal to the money motive in nine-tenths of the activities of life, with the universal 
striving after individual economic security as the prime object of endeavour, with the social 
approbation of money as the measure of constructive success, and with the social appeal 
to the hoarding instinct as the foundation of the necessary provision for the family and for 
the future.”  (Keynes, 1972a: 268-9) 
  
The ultimate problem with Capitalism, however, was when it became ineffective as a 
means to the end which justified it: ‘Capitalism ... is not intelligent, it is not just, it is 
not virtuous – and it doesn’t deliver the goods’ (Keynes, 1982: 239).  Nevertheless, 
despite these criticisms of capitalism, Keynes was anxious not to throw out the baby 
with the bathwater: 
  
“It is common to hear people say that the epoch of enormous economic progress which 
characterised the nineteenth century is over … I believe this is a wildly mistaken 
interpretation of what is happening to us.  We are suffering, not from the rheumatics of old 
age, but from the growing pains of over-rapid changes, from the painfulness of 
readjustment between one economic period and another.” (Keynes, 1972a: 321) 
  
The fundamental, underlying problem in this period is that production is not directly 
production for the sake of consumption, as it is in the two great eras of scarcity and 
abundance, instead we have production for the sake of profit, of accumulation, for the 
sake, that is, of production itself.  A comparison of the category ‘consumption’ as it 
appears in ‘Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren’ (Keynes, 1930c) with that in 
Keynes, 1973a shows it in two diametrically opposed rôles.  Consumption today is 
consumption for production: it does not matter what it is consumption of so long as it 
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contributes to aggregate demand and hence keeps the accumulation of capital going.  In 
the future, in the ‘economic paradise’, production is a mere means, and consumption 
the end: in that context consumption means ‘learning to live wisely and agreeably and 
well’ (Keynes, 1972a: 328), solving ‘the problems of life and human relations, of 
creation and behaviour and religion’ (Keynes, 1972a: xviii).  The critical importance of 
this view of consumption, and its methodological implications, will be taken up in the 
next section. 
  
The problems of this period of ‘capitalistic individualism’ are for Keynes precisely 
those arising from its transitional nature.  The MEC is falling precisely because it has 
fulfilled its purpose.  Its purpose was to promote the accumulation of capital and, in 
general, the wealth of society: the falling MEC (and marginal propensity to consume, 
MPC) are the inevitable result of that accumulation.  Indeed, for Keynes, the definition 
of the ‘economic paradise’ is that the MEC has fallen to zero.  There is nothing 
pathological about this – on the contrary, it is to be expected and desired. 
  
The trouble arises from the institutional context within which the transition was taking 
place, namely that of laissez-faire.  Under laissez-faire, Keynes believed, and believed 
he had demonstrated, the MEC falls faster, and further, than the rate of interest (i).  This 
is due to a peculiarity of money that it can act as a store of value for the individual but 
not for the community – what is true for each individual taken separately is not true for 
all the individuals taken together.  ‘[T]here is no such thing as liquidity of investment 
for the community as a whole’ (Keynes, 1973a: 155).  If the community tries to convert 
part of its aggregate income into a hoard of money, total income simply declines to the 
point where the community no longer tries to do so. 
  
Keynes’s argument is that the natural tendency for the MEC to decline with increasing 
abundance of capital should be matched by an offsetting tendency for MPC to decline 
with increasing income.  i should therefore decline pari passu: the opportunity cost of 
investment – that is, the foregone or postponed consumption – should fall to zero, since 
that portion of income is saved anyway.  Given an adequate institutional framework this 
is what will happen.  The MEC can then decline to zero without falling below i and 
hence without investment being brought to a standstill.  Once the MEC has fallen to 
zero, capital goods are essentially free and we have entered the economic paradise.   
  
However, the institutional framework is not adequate: the laissez-faire system 
introduces an intolerable level of uncertainty.  If every agent were in some way linked 
up to every other so that they could act in concert, each would realise that it is in the 
interest of all to make sure that their saving and investment correspond.  No-one could 
have any interest in a beggar-thy-neighbour policy of hoarding money.  But laissez-
faire means, precisely, that this coordination is lacking.  Laissez-faire divides everyone 
from everyone else: it’s every man for himself. Every agent must now be in ignorance 
as to what his fellows are going to do. Instead of assessing real economic conditions 
each agent must now devote himself to guessing what all the other agents think of those 
conditions, or, rather, to guessing what each other agent guesses every other agent 
guesses...  A rational saver may know that it would be best for all if he (and everyone 
else) were to restrain himself from hoarding money; he may even assume that everyone 
else knows this in theory, but he cannot be certain that everyone will have the necessary 
restraint not to save money ‘just in case’.  Any such suspicion means that he would be 
well advised to increase the liquidity of his assets a little.  But if he, as a rational agent, 
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finds that necessary, then so presumably do other agents.  Every increase in the demand 
for money as an asset, a store of value (or liquidity preference, as Keynes calls such 
demand), is a reduction in aggregate demand (AD).  A reduction in AD means a fall in 
the MEC.  The agent must now believe, correctly, that a severe economic recession is 
on the way, and would be foolish not to build up as large a pool of liquid wealth as 
possible, thereby driving up i yet further.  Even if the agent is fully conscious that he is 
contributing to the crisis, exacerbating it, there is absolutely nothing that he, as an 
isolated individual, can do about it2. 
  
“Many of the greatest economic evils of our time are the fruits of risk, uncertainty, and 
ignorance ... these ... factors are ... the cause of un-employment ... Yet the cure lies outside 
the operations of individuals; it may even be to the interest of individuals to aggravate the 
disease.  I believe that the cure for these things ... would involve Society in exercising 
directive intelligence ... over ... private business.” (Keynes, 1972a: 291-292; my emphasis) 
  
The essence of the prisoners’ dilemma (Denis, 1996a, 2001 Ch 2) is that the prisoners 
are compelled to pursue their partially overlapping and partially conflicting interests 
rationally but without collaboration.  It shows how rationality at the individual (micro) 
level necessarily leads to irrationality at the collective (macro) level under these 
conditions.  The essence of Keynesian opposition to laissez-faire is that by artificially 
dividing economic agents from each other it compels them, in individual self defence, 
to act in a manner detrimental to themselves as a group.  Keynesian agents thus find 
themselves in what we in retrospect can see as a prisoners’ dilemma.  Not, indeed, a 
one-shot game, but an indefinitely repeated one.  Players in an indefinitely repeated 
game may under certain circumstances – a sufficiently large probability of further 
rounds of the game together with a sufficiently low rate of discount of future payoffs – 
find their way to a cooperative outcome.  However, while this is the case for two-player 
games, the achievement of such desirable outcomes rapidly becomes extremely difficult 
as the number of players rises above two.  With any significant number of players, it 
becomes impossible to discriminate between cooperators and defectors, leading to the 
collapse of reciprocity: defection is once more the dominant strategy.  And in the 
Keynesian case we have a multi-player game with the number of players being the 
number of wealth owners who need to determine the proportions of money  and other 
assets to hold in their portfolios.   
  
Keynes says something remarkable, in this connection, in his ‘Notes on the Trade 
Cycle’ (Keynes, 1973a: Ch 22: 313-332).  The crisis, he says, is due to an ‘error of 
pessimism’ in which 
  
“the investments, which would in fact yield 2 per cent in conditions of full employment, 
are expected to yield less than nothing; and the resulting collapse of new investment then 
leads to a state of unemployment in which the investments, which would have yielded 2 
per cent in conditions of full employment, in fact yield less than nothing.”  (Keynes, 1973a: 
322)   
  
Clearly this is not an ‘error’ on the part of the individual investors: they expected yields 
to fall by more than two percentage points and that is exactly what happened; their 
expectations were quite rational.  The ‘error’ is on the part of the investors as a whole: 
it was sheer insanity for them to be pessimistic as it was precisely that pessimism which 
led to the collapse in new investments, the consequent unemployment and hence the 
collapse in yields. The institutional framework of laissez-faire dictates individual 
decision-making on an issue which is fundamentally not an individual matter. 
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Laissez-faire divides economic agents from each other and leads to uncertainty; 
uncertainty leads to increased liquidity preference; raised liquidity preference leads to 
recession; and recession leads to unemployment: ‘A monetary economy ... is essentially 
one in which changing views about the future are capable of influencing the quantity of 
employment’ (Keynes, 1973a: xxii).  ‘Unemployment develops ... because people want 
... money’ (Keynes, 1973a: 235).  Because of this irreducible uncertainty associated 
with the laissez-faire system, Keynes believed that capitalism would settle down to a 
normal condition of under-employment equilibrium: ‘Unemployment ... apart from 
brief intervals of excitement is associated – and in my opinion, inevitably associated – 
with present day capitalistic individualism’ (Keynes, 1973a: 381).  ‘We oscillate ... 
round an intermediate position appreciably below full employment’ (Keynes, 1973a: 
254). 
  
This outcome has two particularly deleterious consequences, other than the obvious one 
that unemployment and a fall in aggregate income is in no-one’s interest.  Firstly, the 
regular fall in the MEC towards zero, and what that is an index of, namely, the 
accumulation of capital up to the desired level of intensity, is broken off.  For as long 
as MEC is below i, this process cannot continue.  Hence our entry into the ‘New 
Jerusalem’, as Lambert (1963: 358) puts it, is postponed for as long as we remain in 
this rut of under-employment. 
  
Secondly, and this is critical for Keynes, unemployment may lead to damaging, 
revolutionary changes, either in the direction of fascism or of communism: ‘it is certain 
that the world will not much longer tolerate [this] unemployment’ (Keynes, 1973a: 
381).  ‘If [income deflation] occurs, our present regime of capitalistic individualism 
will assuredly be replaced by a far-reaching socialism’ (Keynes, 1971: 346).  On another 
occasion, he took comfort from a general willingness to drop the philosophy of laissez-
faire for similar reasons to his own – fear that the existing institutions would otherwise 
be jeopardised.  He could discern, he claimed, ‘a general conviction that the stability of 
our institutions absolutely requires a resolute attempt to apply what perhaps we know 
to preventing the recurrence of another steep descent’ (Keynes, in Hutchison, 1977: 65). 
  
Keynes thus wants reform in order to forestall revolution.  Only change can keep things 
the same.  The next section examines in more detail Keynes’s methodological holism 
which laid the basis for his policy prescription, and subsequent sections examine what 
Keynes believed had to change, what he wanted to remain the same, and how it should 
be done.    
  
III Keynes and holism 
  
In the previous section, I argued that, for Keynes, the underlying problem with 
capitalism was that production was not for the sake of consumption, but for the sake of 
production itself.  To elucidate the relation between production and consumption in 
Keynes, we need to consider a number of passages from the General Theory and early 
drafts.  In a draft chapter of the General Theory (Keynes, 1979), Keynes adopted Marx’s 
formulae for simple commodity circulation and capitalist circulation, C – M – C' and 
M – C – M'.  The first formula says that a commodity, C, is exchanged for money, M, 
and the latter used to purchase another commodity, C'.  The difference between C and 
C' is qualitative: they are different commodities.  The second says that a quantity of 
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money, M is invested in commodities, C, and the latter sold for a quantity of money, M', 
greater than the original quantity (M' = M + M, M > 0)3.  The mistake of the classical 
economists4, Keynes says, was to assume that money has the role only of means of 
exchange, as it does in simple commodity circulation, rather than store of value, as in 
the circulation of capital.  In simple commodity production, production is still for 
consumption: the original commodity is produced in order to sell it and with the 
proceeds purchase the commodity desired for consumption.  In capitalist production, 
the purpose of production is to augment the value of the capitalist’s wealth, and 
consumption is reduced to a means to this end.  In the one case, money is a convenience 
allowing the commodity owner to translate his commodity, produced only for the 
market, into the one he wants to consume.  In the other, money is money capital, money 
is the goal and criterion of production.   
  
“Karl Marx … pointed out that the nature of production in the actual world is not, as 
economists seem often to suppose, a case of C – M – C', ie of exchanging commodity for 
money in order to obtain another commodity.  That may be the standpoint of the private 
consumer.  But it is not the attitude of business, which is a case of M – C – M', ie of parting 
with money for commodity in order to obtain more money.”  (Keynes, 1979: 81) 
  
While the formula for the circulation of capital expresses the ‘standpoint of business’, 
and the structure of incentives under capitalism, in Keynes’s view this involves 
contradictions: although we might behave as though production were carried out for its 
own sake, this cannot literally be true: ‘capital is not a self-subsistent entity existing 
apart from consumption’ (Keynes, 1973a: 106); ‘the expectation of consumption is the 
only raison d’être of employment’(Keynes, 1973a: 211); ‘consumption – to repeat the 
obvious – is the sole end and object of all economic activity’ (Keynes, 1973a: 104).  
The point Keynes is insisting on here is that production has to be validated by 
consumption to count as production: output must be sold to convert it back into money, 
and, indeed, more money than was started with.  The subordination of consumption to 
production implicit in classical laissez-faire capitalism sets up a continually re-
emerging barrier to accumulation in the form of under-consumption and failures of 
aggregate demand.   
  
Keynes’s approach here illustrates the methodological significance of his critique of 
classical economists, from Ricardo to Pigou.  For the individual household, ‘the 
standpoint of the private consumer’, we have C – M – C': consumption is the immediate 
goal of economic activity.  So does this mean that C – M – C' is valid for society as a 
whole?  That is what ‘economists seem often to suppose’.  But that is reductionist: it is 
saying that what is true of the parts is therefore true of the whole.  ‘[T]he nature of 
production in the actual world’ is the opposite: M – C – M': economic activity is directed 
towards the accumulation of claims on future production.   
  
This rejection of reductionism is evidenced over and over again in Keynes’s writings.  
In the famous passage from the ‘Preface’ to the French edition of the General Theory, 
cited in Section 6 of the present paper, Keynes criticises the classical economists for 
erroneously ‘extending to the system as a whole conclusions which have been correctly 
arrived at in respect of a part taken in isolation’ (Keynes, 1973a: xxxii).    
  
The same line of criticism is apparent in Chapter 2 of the General Theory.  Here Keynes 
criticises Ricardo for focusing on microeconomic problems concerning relative prices 
and the allocation of resources between different uses, and his denial of the desirability, 
11 
indeed possibility, of macroeconomic analysis of the level of economic activity as a 
whole.  Keynes cites Ricardo’s letter to Malthus of 9 October 1820: 
  
“Political economy you think is an enquiry into the nature and causes of wealth – I think 
it should be called an enquiry into the laws which determine the division of the produce of 
industry amongst the classes who concur in its formation.  No law can be laid down 
respecting quantity, but a tolerably correct one can be laid down respecting proportions.  
Every day I am more satisfied that the former enquiry is vain and delusive, and the latter 
only the true objects of the science.”  (cited in Keynes, 1973a: 4) 
  
Later in the same chapter he criticises the classical school for its reductionist approach 
to the wage bargain.  Keynes sets out his famous ‘two postulates of classical economics: 
that ‘The wage is equal to the marginal product of labour’, and that ‘the utility of the 
wage when a given volume of labour is employed is equal to the marginal disutility of 
that amount of employment’.  The first says that firms are optimising in the labour 
market, the second that households are.  Keynes conceded the first but denied that the 
second held as a rule.  Classical economists who assumed it to be true forgot, he 
claimed, firstly, that the relationship between real and money wages was different for 
the individual industry and the whole economy:  
  
“In the case of a change peculiar to a particular industry one would expect the change in 
real wages to be in the same direction as the change in money wages.  But in the case of 
changes in the general level of wages … the changes in real wages associated with a change 
in money wages … is almost always in the opposite direction.”  (Keynes, 1973a: 10) 
  
Keynes is clearly reiterating the point that the whole cannot be understood as the sum 
of its parts: the relationship between real and money wages is transformed as we change 
levels.  Here, an increase in money wages in an isolated industry would also be an 
increase in real wages, as the aggregate price level is unaffected; when we come to 
industry as a whole, a change in output will, in Keynes’s opinion, be associated with a 
rise in the price level, and a smaller rise in the level of wages: real wages will fall.   
  
Secondly, according to Keynes – and this is really the same point made another way – 
the classical economists forgot that the principle, that unemployed workers can always 
underbid the employed and so bring supply and demand into equilibrium in the labour 
market, is ‘intended … to apply to the whole body of labour and do[es] not merely mean 
that a single individual can get employment by accepting a cut in money-wages which 
his fellows refuse’ (Keynes, 1973a: 11).  The point is, that if one worker ‘considered in 
isolation’ were to accept a cut in wages, this would be relative to a given price level, 
which would remain unchanged by his actions – and so his, or her, real wage would 
decline in the same proportion as the money wage.  The actions of a single worker, in 
an economy of any significant size, have a vanishingly small impact on the general 
price level.  For the actions of the workers as a whole this is no longer true: an attempt 
to reduce the general level of money wages, via their impact on firms’ marginal costs, 
would lead to reductions in the general price level of about the same magnitude, leaving 
real wages where they were (Keynes, 1973a: 12).  Again, it is clear that Keynes is 
making a point about the relationship between phenomena at the system and substrate 
levels, and criticising the classical economists for failing to see it.  At the substrate level, 
the general price level is a parameter, at the system level it is a variable.   
  
Numerous further examples from Keynes could be cited.  At the risk of labouring the 
point, just two more instances will be considered here, both from the General Theory.  
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In Chapter 19, on ‘Changes in Money Wages’, Keynes once again takes the ‘classical 
economists’ to task, in a passage of such clarity as to render exegesis redundant, for 
impermissibly transferring unexceptionable micro statements to the macro context: 
  
“In any given industry we have … the demand schedule for labour in the industry relating 
the quantity of employment to different levels of wages … This conception is then 
transferred without substantial modification to industry as a whole; and it is supposed by 
a parity of reasoning, that we have a demand schedule for labour in industry as a whole 
relating quantities of employment to different levels of wages … [S]urely [this] is 
fallacious.  For the demand schedules for particular industries can only be constructed on 
some fixed assumption as to the nature of the demand and supply schedules of other 
industries and as to the amount of the aggregate effective demand.  It is invalid, therefore, 
to transfer the argument to industry as a whole … But if the classical theory is not allowed 
to extend by analogy its conclusions in respect of a particular industry to industry as a 
whole, it is wholly unable to answer the question what effect on employment a reduction 
in money wages will have.”  (Keynes, 1973a: 258-260) 
  
Finally, and for exactly the same reasons, we may note that in the chapter of the General 
Theory on ‘The Theory of Prices’  (Keynes, 1973a: Chapter 21, 292-309), Keynes 
rejects the classical dichotomy ‘between the theory of value and distribution on the one 
hand and the theory of money on the other hand’ (Keynes, 1973a: 293).   
  
“The right dichotomy is, I suggest,  between the theory of the individual industry or firm 
and of the rewards and the distribution between different uses of a given quantity of 
resources on the one hand, and the theory of output and employment as a whole on the 
other hand.”  (Keynes, 1973a: 293) 
  
Keynes is again clearly articulating a holist conception here.  The classical dichotomy 
distinguishes between a real supply side and a purely nominal demand side – a 
standpoint which, as he points out, implies that at the macro level ‘the elasticity of 
supply must have become zero and demand proportional to the quantity of money’ 
(Keynes, 1973a: 292).  This classical standpoint tacitly – and illicitly – assumes that 
what is ‘given’ at the micro level, namely the quantity of resources which is employed 
in the economy as a whole, must also be given at the macro-level, the level to which 
monetary theory applies.  This leaves money with no real effects (the real and monetary 
sectors are dichotomous): from our standpoint as observers it is a mere veil over the 
real workings of the economy.  In opposition to this classical dichotomy, Keynes 
proposes his own micro-macro dichotomy: a micro sphere of analysis in which 
conclusions can be ‘correctly arrived at in respect of a part … taken in isolation’ 
(Keynes, 1973a: xxxii), and a macro sphere to be analysed as a whole, as a system, and 
in which money attains critical importance for real outcomes.   
  
IV Keynes’s policy prescription  
  
The overview, in the previous two sections, of Keynes’s dynamic and historical view of 
the pathologies of capitalism, and of his clear sighted articulation of the micro and 
macro levels in economics, lays the basis for an understanding of his policy 
prescription.  Only one further point is required.  In utter contrast to Smith’s invisible 
hand of god, and Hayek’s evolutionary theory of group selection, Keynes never for a 
moment assumes that we live in a world endowed with providential, pro-human 
qualities.  His standpoint is entirely consistent with that of A.E. Houseman’s ‘heartless, 
witless Nature’ (cited, Dawkins, 1995:155).  If good is to be found in the world, it must 
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be the result of our own activity.  In such a world, a policy of laissez-faire is a non-
starter.   
  
So what was Keynes’s policy prescription – and, moreover, who was to execute it?  A 
careful reading of Keynes makes it quite clear what he was prepared to sacrifice, and 
what he was determined at all costs to retain – what it was about ‘our institutions’ and 
‘the kind of system in which we actually live’ (Keynes, 1973a: 247) which he thought 
worth keeping.  What Keynes was concerned to defend was the liberties, the privileges, 
the prestige, the security, the standard of living, and in short the whole mode of life of 
the class of which he was a member: ‘If I am going to pursue sectional interests at all, 
I shall pursue my own.  When it comes to the class struggle as such ... the Class war 
will find me on the side of the educated bourgeoisie’ (Keynes, 1972a: 297).  Far from 
expressing any narrow, sectarian point of view, however, Keynes was able to take this 
stance because of the universality he ascribed to his class.  As we shall see, the 
‘educated bourgeoisie’ was a universal class in the sense that, by following its own 
interests, it would lead the whole population to the destination of economic ‘bliss’.   
  
The ‘educated bourgeoisie’ comprised for Keynes all those sections of society that his 
own activities made him part of – business management and public administration, and 
the worlds of academia and the arts.  It excluded the actual owners of the means of 
production, the rentier capitalists, and it excluded the ‘ordinary’ people who ‘sell 
themselves for the means of life’ (Keynes, 1972a: 328).  Keynes invented a rather 
grotesque raison d’être for this stratum, which runs as follows. The big problem with 
the approach of the ‘economic paradise’ is that ordinary people will not know what to 
do with themselves: 
  
“I think with dread of the adjustment of the habits and instincts of the ordinary man, bred 
into him for countless generations, which he may be asked to discard within a few decades 
... must we not expect a general ‘nervous breakdown’?”  (Keynes, 1972a: 327)  “There is 
no country and no people, I think, who can look forward to the age of leisure and 
abundance without a dread ... It is a fearful problem for the ordinary person, with no special 
talents, to occupy himself ...” (Keynes, 1972a: 328). 
  
Fortunately, however, there are strata of the population who are not ‘ordinary’, who do 
have ‘special talents’.  (These ‘talents’, however, turn out to be of the monetary variety.)  
  
“It will be those people, who can keep alive, and cultivate into fuller perfection, the art of 
life itself, and do not sell themselves for the means of life, who will be able to enjoy the 
abundance when it comes ... the wealthy classes in any quarter of the world ... are, so to 
speak, our advance guard – those who are spying out the promised land for the rest of us 
and pitching their tent there ... those who have an independent income but no associations 
or duties or ties” (Keynes, 1972a: 328). 
  
Keynes immediately takes the opportunity of castigating the idle rich, the rentiers: 
‘most of them have failed disastrously ... to solve the problem which has been set them’ 
(Keynes, 1972a: 328).  Keynes is attacking them for failing to live up to the role he 
ascribes to the rich – the development of a good life of culture and consumption, rather 
than ‘purposiveness’ and hoarding – and thereby undermining the raison d’être of the 
class system.  Keynes’s attitude towards the rentier class is ruthless.  If they will not 
spend their money, take it off them.  He regarded the inheritance of fortunes as a 
specially pernicious, feudal institution, and favoured high death duties to counter its 
effect on the MPC (Keynes, 1972a: 299; Keynes, 1973a: 95, 372-3; Keynes, in 
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Hutchison, 1977: 72).  Meanwhile, to the rest of us he addresses an appeal for another 
chance: ‘I feel sure that with a little more experience we shall use the new-found bounty 
of nature quite differently from the way in which the rich use it today, and will map out 
for ourselves a plan of life quite otherwise than theirs’ (Keynes, 1972a: 328). 
  
Keynes’s belief in the importance of class distinctions comes out clearly when he states 
his differences from communism : 
  
“How can I adopt a creed which, preferring the mud to the fish, exalts the boorish 
proletariat above the bourgeois and the intelligentsia who, with whatever faults, are the 
quality in life and surely carry the seeds of all human advancement ...  It is hard for an 
educated, decent, intelligent son of Western Europe to find his ideals here ... It exalts the 
common man and makes him  everything.” (Keynes, 1972a: 258-259) 
  
We should be quite clear, here, what Keynes means by the bourgeoisie.  Just as he 
borrowed the designation ‘classical economists’ from Marx and then proceeded to use 
it in a completely different – almost opposite – sense5, his use of the term bourgeois has 
little or no overlap with Marx’s conception of the capitalist class.  The ‘educated 
bourgeoisie’, the ‘bourgeoisie and intelligentsia’, in Keynes do not include the owners 
of the means of production, the capitalists per se (whether holders of debt or equity).  
When he explicitly sides with the bourgeoisie, by no means is Keynes erecting an 
apology for the rentier.  The latter he regards as a parasitic excrescence on the 
productive apparatus of society, and one which is in the course of quiet liquidation by 
the spontaneous development of the economy itself: 
  
“The rentier aspect of capitalism [is] a transitional phase which will disappear when it has 
done its work ... the euthanasia of the rentier, of the functionless investor, will be nothing 
sudden, merely a gradual but prolonged continuance of what we have seen recently in 
Great Britain, and will need no revolution.’ (Keynes, 1973a: 376) 
  
This particular terminology adopted by Keynes means that when he speaks of ‘private 
initiative and responsibility’, ‘the traditional advantages of individualism’, ‘personal 
liberty’, and so on, as desirable attributes of capitalism which will be retained in the 
new society (Keynes, 1973a: Ch 24 passim), he is not referring to private property in 
the means of production.  Indeed, the question of private or public ownership of the 
means of production was a non-issue as far as Keynes was concerned:  
  
“It is not the ownership of the instruments of production which it is important for the state 
to assume.” (Keynes, 1973a: 378)  “There is no so-called important political question so 
really unimportant, so irrelevant to the reorganisation of the economic life of Great Britain, 
as the Nationalisation of the Railways.” (Keynes, 1972a: 290) 
  
Nationalisation was a non-issue for Keynes because the ‘educated bourgeoisie’ was in 
fact taking, or had already taken, control of the bulk of industrial – and, indeed, non-
industrial – institutions.  This theme in Keynes – the separation of ownership and 
control, leading to the hegemony of the managers in industry and state – has since 
become a major tradition in its own right.  The theme originally had two aspects, 
distinguishing between holders of debt and equity. In 1923 Keynes described what he 
calls ‘the Investment System’, in these terms: 
  
“Under this phase of capitalism, as developed during the nineteenth century, arrangements 
were devised for separating the management of property from its ownership ... Contracts 
to receive fixed sums of money at future dates must have existed as long as money has 
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been lent and borrowed ... But during the nineteenth century they developed a new and 
increased importance, and had, by the beginning of the twentieth, divided the propertied 
classes into two groups – the ‘business men’ and the ‘investors’ – with partly divergent 
interests ... business men might be investors also, and investors might hold ordinary shares; 
but the division was nevertheless real.” (Keynes, 1972a: 61-62) 
  
The second phase, so to speak, occurs when the rentiers, or ‘investors’, buy up the 
shares, too, and leave the managers without any ownership stake in the enterprise. 
  
“A point arrives in the growth of a big institution ... at which the owners of the capital, ie 
the shareholders, are almost entirely dissociated from the management, with the result that 
the direct personal interest of the latter in the making of great profit becomes quite 
secondary.” (Keynes, 1972a: 289) 
  
Keynes calls this ‘the tendency of big business to socialise itself’ (Keynes, 1972a: 289), 
and describes it as ‘a natural line of evolution.  The battle of Socialism against unlimited 
private profit is being won in detail hour by hour’ (Keynes, 1972a: 290).  A salient 
example cited by Keynes in this context, and – significantly – prior to its nationalisation, 
is that of the Bank of England: ‘there is no class of persons in the kingdom of whom 
the Governor of the Bank of England thinks. less when he decides on his policy than of 
his shareholders.  Their rights, in excess of their conventional dividend have already 
sunk to the neighbourhood of zero’ (Keynes, 1972a: 290). 
  
This conception of what has since been sensationalised as a ‘managerial revolution’ is 
crucial to the understanding of Keynes’s policy prescription.  Keynes’s aim is an 
adequate policy framework for ‘[t]he transition from economic anarchy to a regime 
which deliberately aims at controlling and directing economic forces’ (Keynes, 1972a: 
305).  He wants ‘a somewhat comprehensive socialisation of investment’ (Keynes, 
1973a: 378); he wants ‘planning’ (Keynes, in Hutchison, 1977: 72, 77); he wants, as he 
told Hayek, ‘more planning’ (Keynes, 1980: 387).  He was enthusiastic about the 
proposals for a national plan contained in the Mosley Manifesto (Keynes, 1930b).  ‘The 
central debate in politics, he [sc Keynes] wrote, was between planning and laissez-faire’ 
(Skidelsky, 1975: 241).   
  
But what sort of planning does Keynes want?  Planning by whom?  For whom?  We 
have already seen his contempt for ‘the ordinary man with no special talents’, and for 
‘the mud ... the boorish proletariat’ who ‘sell themselves for the means of life’.  He is 
even less sympathetic towards those at the opposite pole of the social spectrum.  Keynes 
clearly believed that the ‘beastly’, ‘avaricious’ Jews were over-represented, to put it no 
more strongly than that, among the rentier capitalists.  He writes in ‘A Short View of 
Russia’ (Keynes, 1925a) that ‘the mood of oppression ... in Russia ... is the fruit of some 
beastliness in the Russian and Jewish natures ...’ (Keynes, 1972a: 270), and in the same 
article remarks that the Russian Revolution has failed to make the Jews any less 
avaricious (Keynes, 1972a: 259).  In a highly sinister passage, Keynes daydreams about 
the fate of Jewish financiers in the economic paradise to come:  
  
“The love of money as a possession ... will be recognised for what it is, a somewhat 
disgusting morbidity, one of those semi-criminal, semi-pathological propensities which 
one hands over with a shudder to the specialists in mental disease ... Perhaps it is not an 
accident that the race which did most to bring the promise of immortality into the heart 
and essence of our religions has also done most for the principle of compound interest and 
particularly loves this most purposive of institutions.” (Keynes, 1972a: 329-330)6 
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Keynes’s vision of planning, therefore, is one in which the main role is taken by the 
‘educated bourgeoisie’, excluding the ‘common people’ on the one side, and the (mainly 
Jewish) rentiers on the other.  While expressing no particular desire to dispense with 
parliamentary democracy, he clearly regards it as simply irrelevant: ‘in the future the 
Government will have to take on many duties which it has avoided in the past. For these 
purposes Ministers and Parliament will be unserviceable’ (Keynes, 1972a: 301-302). 
  
So, in answer to the question of what it is that Keynes wants to preserve in ‘existing 
economic forms’, what he means when he refers to the preservation of ‘individual 
initiative’ and its ‘successful functioning’ (Keynes, 1973a: 380), I have argued that 
Keynes is anxious, above all, to preserve the status and privileges of his own class, the 
‘educated bourgeoisie’, the ‘advanced guard ... spying out the promised land’.  It is their 
‘individual initiative’ which he wishes to defend.  ‘Private self interest’, expressed 
through consumer preferences on the market, and the exercise of ‘enterprise and skill 
in the estimation of prospective yields’ (Keynes, 1973a: 221) on the part of the 
entrepreneur, ‘will determine what in particular is produced, in what proportions the 
factors of production are combined to produce it, and how the value of the final product 
will be distributed between them’ (Keynes, 1973a: 379).  Just as when Smith and Hayek 
speak of the rights of ‘the individual’ they refer to the individual owner of wealth, the 
individual as vehicle for capital, and in every other context the individual is the servant 
of ‘society’ (Denis, 1999b, 2001 Ch 5), so for Keynes the ‘individual’ who is truly 
efficacious, who enjoys freedom, opportunity and activity, is the ‘educated bourgeois’, 
the gentleman of independent means and public spirit.    
  
It seems fair to summarise Keynes’s vision of planning as a network of ‘semi-
autonomous bodies’ – quangos and quagos linked together and to the national bank by 
a board of public investment: 
  
“Progress lies in the growth and the recognition of semi-autonomous bodies within the 
state ... bodies which in the ordinary course of events are mainly autonomous within their 
prescribed limitations, but are subject in the last resort to the sovereignty of the democracy 
expressed through Parliament.” (Keynes, 1972a: 288-289) 
  
Now, even the private enterprise firms of the laissez-faire period were ‘in the last resort’ 
subject to parliamentary sovereignty.  To say this of the ‘semi-autonomous bodies’ is to 
say very little.  In practice, what we have is a new laissez-faire, differing from the old 
in being collective rather than individualistic. The managerial class, which has quietly 
triumphed in both the formally private and the formally public sectors, is to be allowed 
to get on with it, free – in the ordinary course of events – of effective parliamentary 
supervision, regulation or restraint. 
  
Keynes’s articles in The Times in January and March, 1937, provide perhaps the most 
explicit statement of how these ‘semi-autonomous bodies’ are to be linked, as well as a 
useful ostensive definition of ‘semi-autonomous body’: 
  
“Now is the time to appoint a board of public investment ... to make sure that detailed plans 
are prepared.  The railway companies, the port and river authorities, the water, gas and 
electricity undertakings, the building contractors, the local authorities, above all, perhaps, 
the London County Council and the other great corporations with congested population, 
should be asked to investigate what projects could be usefully undertaken if capital were 
available at certain rates of interest – 3½%, 3%, 2½%, 2%.  The question of the general 
advisability of the schemes and their order of preference should be examined next.  What 
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is required at once are acts of constructive imagination by our administrators, engineers, 
and architects, to be followed by financial criticism, sifting and more detailed designing.” 
(Keynes, in Hutchison, 1977: 72) 
  
This is one half of the strategy. The other half is to ascertain from the mass of 
information obtained in this, and every other conceivable way, what rate of interest 
would be compatible with a flow of new projects just sufficient to absorb what the 
nation chooses to save: 
  
“The rate of interest must be reduced to the figure that the new projects can afford.  In 
special cases subsidies may be justified.  But in general it is the long-term rate of interest 
which should come down to the figure which the marginal project can earn ... We have the 
power to achieve this.  If we know what rate of interest is required to make profitable a 
flow of new projects at the proper pace, we have the power to make this rate prevail in the 
market.” (Keynes, in Hutchison, 1977: 73) 
  
There are three points worth noting here, as to why Keynes is so confident about the 
rate of interest, when, after all, he had only recently proclaimed himself ‘somewhat 
sceptical of the success of a merely monetary policy directed towards influencing the 
rate of interest’ (Keynes, 1973a: 164).   
  
The first point is that the Bank of England had already been cited by Keynes as a 
progressive example of ‘semi-autonomous body’, and of course the Treasury consists 
entirely of administrators and economists. The two institutions could therefore be 
depended upon, once Keynesian ideas had made themselves felt, to take the side of the 
‘educated bourgeoisie’ against the rentiers, on the one side, and against interference by 
the electorate via parliament, on the other.   
  
The second point is that due to the institutionally powerful position in the market of the 
Treasury and central bank, ‘it lies within their power ... to make the long-term rate of 
interest what they choose within reason’ (Keynes, in Hutchison, 1977: 73).  The 
channelling of savings through the national bank, too, would give the state additional 
leverage against the rentier class and undermine the ability of the latter to dictate 
absolutely the rate of interest on borrowed capital (Keynes, in Hutchison, 1977: 73, 
Keynes, 1973a: 376). 
  
Thirdly, the plan has been drawn up by the business community themselves, and in a 
collective rather than individualistic way. Everyone knows what the rest of the economy 
is doing and no-one has any incentive to increase his liquid reserves. Consequently, 
there is nothing to force i up above MEC at full-employment.  Uncertainty has been 
eliminated at the outset by removing the artificial isolation of economic agents imposed 
by the anachronistic laissez-faire approach to policy.  The payoffs to holding money 
and bonds have been changed so that the prisoners’ dilemma has been removed.   
  
V Did Keynes reject laissez-faire?   
  
So, did Keynes rejected laissez-faire?  In the past three answers have been given – yes, 
no, and yes and no – all of them false.  The first has tended to be associated with more 
left-wing interpreters of Keynes, such as Joan Robinson, and the second both with more 
conservative interpreters, and with left-wing anti-Keynesians, such as Geoffrey Pilling.  
The third alternative, that Keynes was inconsistent in his attitude to laissez-faire, has 
been a very common one, and in the 1930s cartoons used to appear in the press of 
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Keynes as a double-jointed man supporting, for example, both free-trade and 
protection.  
  
These approaches fail to do Keynes justice.  It is true that Keynes did not make the final 
break with classical economic theory until around 1933, and he himself aptly 
summarised his life to this point as ‘a long struggle of escape’ (Keynes, 1973a: xxiii).  
In spite of this, his general social and political philosophy was consistent throughout 
his productive life and, I would argue, the changes in his economic theory were 
designed specifically to supply a theoretical underpinning for his political attitudes: 
‘The field of social philosophy is the field in which Keynes remained consistent 
throughout his career’ (Lambert, 1963: 344). 
  
“While the General Theory marks a sharp break in economic theory, the ‘social 
philosophy’ implications he drew from the work [in Chapter 24] are consistent with his 
earlier views.  In fact the General Theory can be viewed as giving an economic theoretic 
rationalisation for views that Keynes’s ethics and intuition had led him to.” (Minsky, 1975: 
145) 
  
While they can thus agree that Keynes was consistent, commentators are anything but 
agreed on what it was that Keynes was (supposedly consistently) saying: ‘Keynes [is] 
essentially an economic liberal arguing for specific non-liberal measures solely in 
periods of unemployment’ (Corry, 1978: 26).  ‘When the whole question of seeing that 
potential savings are not run to waste in unemployment … is added to the agenda [of 
government], it seem as if there is precious little non-agenda left’ (Robinson, 1964: 81). 
  
The reason why these views are mistaken is that they take the supposed Keynesian 
rejection of laissez-faire (whether they assert or deny that rejection) to be a rejection a 
limine.  It is not.  An implication of the present paper is that it is a critique – a concrete 
negation with a concrete result.  Keynes’s view of laissez-faire is not absolute but 
conditional and historical.  His call for state intervention to equilibrate saving and 
investment is, in his own view, by no means timelessly or universally valid.   
  
The difference between himself on the one hand, and, on the other, the old-fashioned 
Liberals as well as the classical school whose theories underlay the laissez-faire 
approach, was that Keynes ‘explained the phenomena, which the old Liberal school 
attributed to the unchanging and universal character of natural law, in terms of positive 
and therefore changeable laws and of the particular conditions obtaining at a given time 
and a given place’ (Lambert, 1963: 345). 
  
Lambert here is commenting on Keynes’s first book, Indian Currency and Finance 
(1913), written when Keynes was still, in terms of economic theory, entirely within the 
neoclassical school.  The point is that even where, as in his work prior to World War I, 
Keynes obtained results formally consonant with the neoclassical and liberal traditions, 
such as the correctness of the laissez-faire approach to the economic policy framework 
in the nineteenth century, these results were obtained on the basis of a different, more 
concrete and more historical methodology.  It was this methodology which enabled him 
to develop a vision of what was wrong with laissez-faire, when his contemporaries 
could only see that something was wrong (Pigou, for example, in the 1930s), and hence 
enabled him to develop a theoretical account of the economic problems of his time.   
  
*     *     * 
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“Whilst, therefore, the enlargement of the functions of government involved in the task of 
adjusting to one another the propensity to consume and the inducement to invest, would 
seem to a nineteenth- century publicist or to a contemporary American financier to be a 
terrific encroachment on individualism, I defend it, on the contrary, both as the only 
practicable means of avoiding the destruction of existing economic forms in their entirety 
and as the condition of the successful functioning of individual initiative.” (Keynes, 1973a: 
380)  
  
This passage, from the final chapter of the General Theory, is a concise statement of 
Keynes’s rejection of laissez-faire.  Yet taken out of context, it could be extremely 
misleading.  The ‘enlargement of the functions of government’ does, it is true, include 
an expansion in the role of the existing state.  This is concerned principally with the 
adjustment of the propensity to consume by manipulation of the rates of income tax and 
death duty, and by deciding how sharply progressive should be the former, channelling 
savings through a national savings bank, and a programme of emergency public works 
in severe recessions.   
  
But this is not the main point for Keynes.  His goal is not simply an ‘enlargement of the 
functions’ but a change in the nature of the state.  What he wants is an extra- or non-
parliamentary state consisting of a central bank and a national planning board linking 
together the enterprises (in the broadest sense) of the country into a single organisation. 
This organisation would, through discussion, draw out a consensus of the whole of the 
‘educated bourgeoisie’; there would be no call for compulsion.  The cancellation of the 
artificial separation and atomisation of the ‘entrepreneurs’ (that is, the managerial 
class), by the principles of laissez-faire, would eliminate the uncertainty which gives 
rise both to damaging fluctuations in economic activity and to the under-employment 
equilibrium around which the economy oscillates. 
  
This, then, is how a theory can be simultaneously ‘revolutionary’ (Keynes, 1935) and 
‘moderately conservative’ (Keynes, 1973a: 377) in its implications.  The 
(revolutionary) introduction of central controls and planning to achieve full 
employment at the macro level is to provide the necessary environment in which the 
(conservative) micro-level ‘Manchester system’ comes into its own’ (Keynes, 1973a: 
378-379).  Keynes wants to combine micro-level individualism with the macro-level 
planning required to preserve it.  To put it another way, individual self-seeking 
behaviour at the micro level will generate desirable social outcomes at the macro level 
when the institutional framework ensures that the payoffs to individual actions are such 
as to avoid prisoners dilemmas.   
  
The transition from the Era of Scarcity to the capitalist epoch required central controls 
on production and distribution to reduce uncertainty and the rate of interest, and raise 
the marginal efficiency of capital.  This was the age of mercantilism and absolutism.  
Now, in the period of transition from capitalism to the ‘economic paradise’, similar 
problems call for similar solutions: a latter-day mercantilist policy (Keynes, 1973a: 
Chapter 23), ‘promoted by an authority unlikely to be superseded’ (Keynes, 1973a: 
203). 
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VI Conclusion: Keynes and providentialism 
  
In a holist view of the world, the individual agents composing an economic system are, 
and are primarily, components of a social totality: their life process is determined by 
their mutual relations, the totality of which is the economic system.  Under capitalism, 
however, the individual agents are divorced from each other and their relations are 
refracted through their sole link with society: the money nexus.  This gives them the 
appearance of independent, asocial, biological totalities, and hence gives the real social 
totality the appearance of a mere congeries.   
  
It is in a sense immaterial where the economist commences his study of society, whether 
he ‘starts’ from the part and deduces therefrom the nature of the whole, or vice versa.  
Friedman, for example, correctly observes that both he and Keynes work ‘from the top 
down’, while many monetarists and Keynesians work in the opposite direction 
(Friedman, 1976: 316).  That makes no difference: what matters is not where you ‘start’ 
but where you end up: do you understand the economy as a totality – with Keynes, 
Marx, Hayek, and Smith – or as a congeries – with Friedman, Lucas, and the 
neoclassical school.   
  
Reductionism is implicit in the ‘classical’ methodology that Keynes criticised, as well 
as the methodology of those neoclassical writers, such as Friedman, who re-assert the 
claims of pre-Keynesian economics post-Keynes.  The agent is a rational, utility-
maximising being; since society is merely a mass of like individuals, the results of the 
analysis of his behaviour can be applied directly to society as a whole.   Thereby the 
latter is shown to be a rational, welfare-maximising aggregate of many individuals.  
Protracted, general, involuntary unemployment is not possible: no rational individual 
would under-utilise scarce resources, so humanity in the aggregate must necessarily be 
just as rational.  On the other hand, the appearance of unemployment can be explained 
away as false appearance concealing the intrinsic rationality of the system: irrationality 
on the level of the system cannot be the fault of the system but only of the individuals 
comprising it – so apparent unemployment must in fact be voluntary, caused, for 
example, by wage rigidity or other micro-irrationality.   
  
Keynes, summarising his whole approach in a passage to which I have already drawn 
attention, goes straight to the heart of this question: 
  
“I have called my theory a general theory.  I mean by this that I am chiefly concerned with 
the economic system as a whole … And I argue that important mistakes have been made 
by extending to the system as a whole conclusions which have been correctly arrived at in 
respect of a part taken in isolation.”  (Keynes, 1973a: xxxii) 
  
Keynes is saying that the principal differentia of his method from that of the ‘classical 
economists’ is that the system as a whole cannot be considered as a mere congeries of 
individuals ‘taken in isolation’.  This is so because those individuals are not isolated 
from each other: what one does affects others.  An individual’s decision to save or to 
invest or to hold money, for instance, has consequences for other individuals who are 
not party to the relevant transaction and hence unable to affect its outcome.   
  
In this clash between the private form and public consequences of the decisions to 
consume, and to save, to hold money and to invest, we see again the combination of 
independence in form and interdependence in content of those decisions, which lies at 
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the heart of the prisoners dilemma (Denis, 1996a, 2001 Ch 2).  Keynes sees this clash 
between private action and public consequence as remediable only by the removal of 
the anachronistic private form of decision-making.  Hence Keynes’s opposition to 
laissez-faire and his demands for social control of the propensity to consume, for the 
‘comprehensive socialisation of investment’, and for ‘communal saving through the 
agency of the state’ (Keynes, 1973a: 378, 376).   
  
Keynes’s holism lies essentially in this: were the community as a whole, or some state 
agency representing it, to control saving and investment, there would need never be any 
discrepancy between the two.  The desirability of the marginal unit of investment would 
be equal to the sacrifice involved in the marginal unit of saving, and with the 
accumulation of wealth, both would decline to zero.   
  
The problem is the presence of an anachronistic institutional framework – laissez-faire 
– which fragments the decision-making process without mitigating the social 
consequences of the decisions made.  The community can only do two things with its 
income: consume it or invest it.  The individual acting on the basis of self-interest, 
however, has third alternative: he can hoard part of his income as money.  Indeed, if he 
foresees any slackening of aggregate demand, he would be unwise not to, even if he 
realises the damage he will inflict on the economy thereby: ‘Every act of saving 
involves a ‘forced’ inevitable transfer of wealth to him who saves, though he in his turn 
may suffer from the saving of others.’  (Keynes, 1973a: 212)  Hence hoarding, which 
is the cause of the economic disease, is the rational response of individuals to the fear 
of that disease: ‘It may even be to the interest of individuals to aggravate the disease.’  
(Keynes, 1972a: 318).  Though in practice the matter might be highly complex, the 
solution is in principle simple: that individuals should act no longer as individuals but 
as a collectivity, in so far as quantitative investment decisions are concerned.   
  
*     *     * 
  
The assumption standing behind pre- and post-Keynesian mainstream economics is that 
the unintended consequences of individual actions are essentially benign.  This 
providential assumption pervades the writings of Smith and Hayek, Friedman and 
Lucas.  Keynes devoted his theoretical life to the demonstration that unintended 
consequences, just because they are unintended, are uncontrolled and liable to be 
thoroughly malign: 
  
“The world is not so governed from above that private and social interests always coincide 
… It is not a correct deduction form the principles of economics that enlightened self-
interest always operates in the public interest.”  (Keynes, 1972a: 287-288)  “There is no 
design but our own … the invisible hand is merely our own bleeding feet moving through 
pain and loss to an uncertain … destination.”  (Keynes, 1981: 474) 
  
Keynes’s rejection, in these passages, of providentialism and the invisible hand bring 
us full circle.  The episodes in the history of economic thought considered in Denis 
(2001) have shown that the combination in decision-making of independence in form 
and interdependence in content is an issue which continually re-emerges in political 
economy.  At every stage there is a clash between the scientific and the vulgar, the desire 
to understand and explain, on the one hand, and fear of the consequences of doing so, 
on the other.  Providentialism plays a key role here.   
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In Denis (2001) I focused on two sophisticated attempts to underpin a reductionist 
laissez-faire policy prescription with a holistic methodology.  Smith and Hayek, though 
separated by two centuries, have proposed very similar invisible hand mechanisms to 
mediate between the holistic nature of the world and the reductionist character of their 
desired policy framework.  Consideration of Keynes has shone a light on their attempts: 
his account gives us an outstanding example of the fate of laissez-faire political 
economy if a holistic approach is not supplemented with the deus ex machina of an 
invisible hand.   
  
The precise content of Keynes’s escape from the twin laissez-faire strategies of 
reductionism, on the one hand, and holism plus an invisible hand, on the other, is 
perhaps of less interest than its existence.  Keynes had a particular view of the class of 
which he was part – he saw it as a universal class in a Hegelian sense, leading humanity 
from darkness into light.  He was also, in my reading, a virulent racist with very strong, 
deeply ambiguous feelings about Jews.7  I believe that all of this shaped and coloured 
his reading of writers such as Ricardo and Marx, his positive analysis, and his policy 
prescription.  So from the perspective of this paper, the details are less important than 
the fact that he showed that there was an escape route: the economy is to be studied as 
a system and not as a congeries, and our default is to act, not to do nothing.  Against the 
atomism of the ‘classical’ economists he argues for a clear, holistic, systems view, and 
against the providentialism of the invisible hand theorists he simply and clear-sightedly 
denies that any such providential mechanism exists, and shows in detail the 
implications, positive and normative, of that denial.   
  
So for Keynes, the invisible hand ensuring that desirable social consequences flow from 
self-seeking individual behaviour is a myth: but the job it was supposed to do, the 
reconciliation of partially conflicting and partially overlapping interests, still needs to 
be done.  This reconciliation is to be achieved in Keynes’s view by the universal class, 
the educated bourgeoisie, and, in particular, by the extra-parliamentary state which it 
will build, based around a board of national planning linking all the enterprises of the 
country to the central bank.  For Keynes it is precisely the educated bourgeoisie which 
will take the place of the invisible hand.   
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Notes 
 
* This paper has been presented at the London Guildhall University Department of Economics research 
seminar and the fourth annual conference of the Association for Heterodox Economics, Dublin, July 
2002, and I should like to thank seminar participants, and Mary Denis, William Dixon, and Geoffrey 
Kay, for their support and helpful comments.   
 
1 It has been argued (Geoffrey Kay, personal communication) that both Robinson and Pilling were right, 
here, since they meant different things by ‘historical’.  However, Pilling clearly believed he was talking 
about the same thing as Robinson and that she was wrong: ‘One cannot … accept Joan Robinson’s 
confident assertion about Keynes’ – ie the assertion that Keynes viewed capitalism as a phase in historical 
development (Pilling, 1986: 57).  On this latter point Pilling was clearly wrong and Robinson right.  
However, one might wish to go further and argue that there was a sense in which Pilling was right about 
Keynes being unhistorical because he, Keynes, had a notion of capital which was in some sense timeless.  
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But this goes beyond the question of whether Keynes had a historical view of capitalism, and slides over 
into another question, namely whether he had what one believes to have been the correct historical view 
of capitalism.  That is not an issue I am addressing here. 
 
2 In the context of a discussion of different forms of the prisoners’ dilemma Douglas Hofstadter has 
introduced a concept of ‘reverberant doubt’ which describes exactly what Keynes is concerned with here: 
‘Isn’t this an amazing and disturbing slide from certain restraint ...  It is a cascade, a stampede, in which 
the tiniest flicker of doubt has become amplified into the gravest avalanche of doubt.  That is what I mean 
by ‘reverberant’ doubt’ and one of the annoying things about it is that the brighter you are, the more 
quickly and clearly you see what there is to fear’ (Hofstadter, 1985: 753). 
 
3 In Marx, the second formula is true of merchant capital, which buys cheap in one market and sells the 
same commodities dear in another market; in capitalist production proper the original money capital is 
invested in means of production – constant and variable capital (c, v) – which are then consumed in the 
process of production, generating new commodities which are subsequently sold for more than the value 
of the means of production: M – C: MP (c, v) … P … C' – M' (Marx, 1974: 25). 
 
4 Throughout this paper, the term ‘classical’ follows Keynes’s usage, not Marx’s.  See next footnote.   
 
5 For Marx, ‘classical’ political economy referred to scientific economics – ie economics which, he felt, 
tried to explain, rather than to explain away, the nature of capitalistic production – from Petty in the late 
17th century on, and culminating in Smith and Ricardo.  Subsequent mainstream economists Marx 
designated ‘vulgar’, and considered to be only interested in explaining away the undesirable features of 
capitalism.  Marx, however, explicitly noted Ricardo’s acceptance of Say’s Law as an apologetic and 
vulgar element ‘unworthy’ of his otherwise classical and scientific approach.  For Keynes, on the 
contrary, ‘classical’ economists are precisely those mainstream economists, since Ricardo, who, like 
Ricardo himself, adopt Say’s Law: he names JS Mill, Marshall, Edgeworth and Pigou as examples (GT: 
3).  Hence, for Keynes, the labour theory of value of Smith and Ricardo is ‘pre-classical’ (GT: 213).   
 
6 It should, I think and hope, be clear that presenting my interpretation of economists’ writings implies 
no endorsement of their stance, but so that there should be no possibility of misinterpreting my motives 
in reporting Keynes’s views here, I completely dissociate myself from his racist remarks and standpoint 
regarding supposedly ‘avaricious’ Jews and ‘boorish’ proletarians alike.   
 
7 This was mixed up in his mind with sexual questions – passages in his essays on Einstein and Dr 
Melchior being particularly remarkable expressions of this potent mixture of racial and sexual issues.  It 
would be inappropriate, however, to develop this theme further here.   
 
